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THE EVOLUTION OF UNJUST-DISMISSAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT
In the last ......., state cnnts in IIIiU1Y areas of the United states have
ruled in favor of eqlloyeeB alleqin;J they were inptcp::rly disnissed. Many
eccn::IIIi.sts have c:::a1t:endIBd that any j.xJicial or legislative departure fran the
eqlloyDBlt-at-will doctrine is 1&:JL iw arxl inefficient because it restricts
eqlloyDBlt flexibility arxl !leedau of a;liuact. 'Ihis paper advarres an
eIItlluti.a1aIy theaIy of unjust-di.....ipsal leqislatial in ~d1 eqlloyer gro.lpS
eventually Sll(:pOl't unjust-d1snissa] leqislatial in respalSe to the threat of
1aJ:ge arxl variable damage awards inp:sed by the judicial system. Legislation
is scu;)ht to clearly define prcp!rty rights arxl to limit eqlloyer liability.
In~to the CXiWUI law, the unjust-diSllissal laws that have been
p",poeed. are likely to result in SIIIa1ler awards, reduce uncertainty, resolve
displtes rapidly, arxl reduce legal arxl other transactialS costs. An
institutialal arxl E!IIpirical analysis Sl!pp"'T'ts the ccnclusial that the pIqXlSal
of unjust-disnisml leqislatial is a respCllSe to cx:urt rulin3s that weaken and
cbfusc:ate the eqllcyers' right to disniss eqlloyeeB at will. 'Ihis evideooe is






(609)452-4845P the last 100 years, jth secirity in the Uhit1 States has been
governad by the o law"ip1oynit-at-will" doctrine.1 unier this
doctrine, an loyer can l'fly di ii an loyee for a go reason, a
bad reason, or r reason at all. The ployer's urinitigatad right to ini
at-willeaployees, Iever, has been wsaksrd by autc*s state rt
r'1ins in severs]. juri.sdictia in the 19808. In iticzi, legislation to
require sane form of "just "e" to di iiiat-will ez,1oyees has been
intrxt in t state legislatures.2 Jirxl in 1987, 1tana passad larxtnark
legislation reiirin finne to have a just reason to fire a rker. E4tein
(1984), Lazear (1987), ar (1988), aid others have aiqued that jticial aid
legislative dartuxea fran the doctrine sild be resisted
because they have de1etericts ic effects.
This paper fes on the pitive issue of the origin of unjust-
dini.al legislation irtea1 of the ri...n..tive issue of whether th
legislation is desirable.3 'flu paper advar the hypothesis that irdepeident
jtdiciary decisia lead a state's legislative braith to pre an unjust-
dinial law to clarify loynnt rights aid to limit ei1oyer liability.
Urder the strict eiployunt—at—will doctrine the prcçerty rights to j —
neaninthe set of acticr that either party to an eeçloyziit relationship
ild take to terminate the relatiahip —areclearly defined aid enfor.
Ja,y (1982) for an historical o'.rervi., of zp1oynnt at will.
2Legislatirni six±i as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 aid the ?qe
Die rfr&ination in 1oynt Act also restrict the right to fire at will. My
interest in this paper, Ie,er, is in legislation whidi vers a broad class of actia aid is rct limit.ed to p tlcilar surape of the rkfor.
3bcanples of other eorzunic analyses of the factors 1e&th to the
pesge of laws irxlixie Leffler's (1978) aid Blodi's (1975) analyses of
suçort for the mirthi.mi 'vge, Farber's (1988) analysis of the determinants
of state piblic sector baxgaininj laws, aid Feeerg aid Thsen's (1987)
examinationof states' decigias to irdex tax laws.2
state ts iiiify' the o—.... .law,luve.r, t1 prcperty rights to jc1
b.tuxta.tharxl ixx2lete. Ieover, unjust-di ni1gaits inpDse
large legal ts at all partise ar rry the prect of
urçredictable, highly variable, azzi osiaiaJ.ly e,ssive awsr1s.
An irtithtima1 ar iricl analysis ts that the binati of
uricerta.th prcperty rights ar large palties for violatiat of the n*i1s
preerrts set by state -ts has r—d or reversed ployer c rtitiat to
wtjust-d1'ii1 legislatkm in iny jurisdictia in the U.S. A variety of
evidx su.çorts the ox1usJ that justfirirlegislatia is often
rtad by rployers in a state in orr to eçlicitly re-define ar enfor
prcçerty rights, ard bemuselaws will limit the xi daneges that
firm n be This olusiai is lxiztent with the iventiaia].
poliH cal y vied of unjust—il l al legislaticrt inplicit in Bledes
(1967), Stier (1979), ard e].sre, thid predicts that s'xt protective
labor 1egislaticz will, be rted by ep1oye ardj.re1byexloyers.
The explanat.im for prcçoeed unjust di i1 legislatiadeveloped in
this paper uey be relevant to a variety of other cuitcts. For exanpie, the
legislative history of stats rk' c'cnpensaticm laws —thidwsre enacted
with the jt of both the rican Federatiat of labor ard the Naticrial
Assoclatim of riafbirers at the begixmix of the ttieth century —
closelyparallels the re,rt develpi'i.ts in unjust-din4 1laws.4 idea
that r—fault, ]Jinitel liability legislatiat is a respae to 1thanes
in the-'law to have broed aplicatia.
4The ?iFL officially orted wodt'saxçeratiat legislaticm in 1909, arx* Prsejdent Giçers wss a laeder in ir's axçaticrr In the s yser, a rvey of the 1urrhip of the Natia Msociaticn of
nifacthrerg faixt a large jority of b.iiees in favor of wor)'s
crperatiat legis],atim (see Se ard Sars, 1954, p.31).3
1. At-will 1cAt itheoces.Pr4iIn1.
As a brk, it is ueeful to xzider the cxzxUtia tner whicth
d,artures friczn the lnt-at-will ctrine will affect nic
efficiency.5 As is U krxn, the Oase principle holds that ifprcperty
rights are cleari.y defined ai tradeable with zero t anaacti ts, then
eiic efficicy is i eident of the original distrib.zticri of prtçerty
6urxe.r tjiees aatia, tt aiioticn of prerty rights will have
distribiticxia].e for the partiee invo].ved, b.tt will nct affect the
afloti of resr or the Pareto tiiielity of a irket euuy. This
has inçortant iiçlicatia for the legal xitroversy over aploynnt—at-will.
In particular, if the rights to jcte (e.g., the restricti az review
proores that govern firii) are clearly defined, tradeable, ar if
tranaacticn a,sts are lneiificant, then a direct aplicatia of the ase
principle i1d izply that ecuic efficixy is inenient of tether the
right to terminate an xployment relatihip at will, is originally assigr
to the ployer or to the ezployee. 1b illustrate this point, ider the
equiva1 of the foildxexanplee.
In the firet eiiple, ezployers have the legal right to arbitrarily fire
apoyees at will. Suçe that ployees value protecticzi fx arbitrary
ilii4&thas arded by grievan proures at $100 per year, az
ployers value the cptiai to fire eloyeee arbitrarily (e.g., to avoid
haviz grievaz prcrea to reviøi di.itai discaxg) at $50 per year.
5threnberg (1985) provides a usefulzrvey of the ecxxnic inçlicatia,s
of the e1ploynnt-at-wiU cctrine.






















 siirity re foth1tlr, kever, it ild still be possible for tres to
take plalxqother erg1x. For e3caiiçle,if it re rninally
illegal to pay a hJ apriun to re1iiiith the prerty right to
pottia fran arbitrary di41, an loyer .2ld OL this
prdibitim by offerirg a severar payut to a.iiniced eçlcyee
itiaml a the loyee rt danqirq t.te ii 1 •itigitre is
pottlal for trea al other diera of jths, there are differit
traztia sts c-4iitM with alteatia in the ployuit-at-will
ctrmns. If tramacticr ts irthibit tries, the efficiat afltict
.i].d be to assign the right to taminaticn reviri to the party that valu it
t hl4ly.8
A relatel is&* is dther jth terminatia rights can be clearly defines
wer alternative legal sds. As di9,Dd in the zct secticm, the
—.- lawsysten gratss idierable tuxrtairity over the
aiinership of jcb prçerty rights aid over the pialties for violatia of
t1e rights. Ei for cases with sisilar cixatares, ards in unjust—
liial iits vary dpinj a the partic!1lr j aid jury. This
urxertainty can be diaracterize1 by an aszd distribitia that is sk
positive, rarirg fran zez (d irithdes situatics re an eiployee do
xt brirg a iit) to a large ard.ante urvrtainty ild ithibit
7vise .qssts that this strategy is acbially usei: A ireau of
Naticxal Affairs () e.veyxftain1985 f that 23% of eployers
rortad the "e of sev-eraz agreits with terminated aployees for
release of any claim agaixt the organizatiai" (, 1985; p. 1).
itia, it iiy be efficieit to shift the right to jth sirity over
tire. For ixtame, givi the urcertainty of jth ntthes, eiployers ny value the right to diniatwill ze highly far rily-hired zcers. This nay
e,qlain the existeix of prthatiaiary periods during thicth iw iployees can













$93,000 for exnanic losses by a 'xitana jury. . cira.uiEtazs of this case
were as fofla. Flanigen, after 34 years of service at PrxIentia1 Federal,
was given fair nmthe notice that she i].d be terminated bie of nic
1itia. was edvised betly, Iver, to att a week-lc*i
trai.nii program in Salt Lake City, Utah to prare for a x jcb as a bank
teller. Deite having att the trainin 2rse, Flanigan was disctarged
wit1xzt notice or hearir lees than . 1th after as&zmir a pceitia as a
teller. was given six n1the pay as a severaz benefit. She was also
later offered an cççortunity to return as a part-tim teller, bit refused.
a-t reascxd that Flanigan's dJ.sdarge violated the cvenant of goxI
faith anl fair dealixx inplicit in p1oynt re1at1czishis. reoer, the
Flanioan verdict ar award e both affi ri appeal by the )Sxxtana Supr
Oxirt in Jwe 1986.
Inanother infltitial case (Faxrer v. ?rii n Oil), Midae1 Farrens
was distharged for allegedly pu1,asin driilin nizi fran a pp1ier at
inflated prices, for bein a the take, for 1tniively usiz the nii
supplier, az for beirrj a nether of the nisupplier's boardof directors. A
Bilhii juryfainithese tharges to be factually izrrect, ani awarded the
34 Year-old anical Qineer $2.51411frr far K1Dic losses. After
appeal, the Ninth Cirailt zrt of A1Q theliability claim tut
ruled that the evid 4porthd a $1.7 millia award for eunic damages.
At the ti he was d111, Farru was earnixwj $85,500 per year: $63,000
i1ary, $11,000 ban2s, ard $11,500 frin'es. Altlu4l the Flanloan ard Farrens
cases are extree exanpies, they reflect the potential losses that eplfers
faced if they were thal].ened in an ijt-d141 case.
ployer gr protested the large initxeof s of the awards i.n8
unjust—dii11ceses, arxl cbjectai to the uncertainty ani expe eated by
the evo1virj -.-- law.11As a ,manyiployer gr vigors1y
orted wijlt-di i'11egis1ati. Qxider, for eple, the testiy
of Kay Foster before the )tTftana State legislature:
I aim a b2sljs mr aid Dty )yor of 8ilhixs, açearir ibalfof the BiLtIns Area thaber of
Biuur ther acorts 41 [the
Wrtrçful Disthaige Fros lt ct] aid the positive i,."-t it will have, particularly i the bsIness
(.mnity inarea. Wruful distharge has becuxe the
favored tt t'liiiiinthe Biuin District aid Federal irts with the uniter of .is1lingfrcmi '2' in 1981
to '89' In 1985.rlsin u'er of €1.4itallowed
tader preeeut )utana statutes has be a major
disincutive to lol bineea decrektit aid e,cparia
of eplaymut. (ted fros Kay Foster's writt
testlixriy cui 11B241, Jarniary 28, 1987.)
flie unjtt—di 'illegislatiau that sprcpceedazxt macted in ?rtana
'saiea].Jnto eiployers althc*4it required a stardard of "just
t-i1ie"fordiii 1 (aid other persczil actiaas dBItic*s), it
liimited an aloyee's ability to reer p.initive daes to ses where it
ild be establiied that the eiçler acted with "actual fraid or actual
malice. "Inthe vast majority of 'es re actual frmd or actual malice
cen rct be establid, the maxinum azd an euployee can rever is limited
Th iticau to direct legal fees, other trarmactis ts iixirred in unja.t di i 1 1 4 are likely to incline a loss of mant tima tiile
prrin the case, ges to esployee relatia, deterioratii of the firm's
pblic 4e, aid the release of *iZ1itial aid prcçirietary information
thidi may be loited by xaiçetitors.
The act defines a dl i l as wrqfu]. if it is rct "for good cause,"
or if it is "In reta]iatiai for U* eauployee's refusal to violate p.iblic
policy," or if it violates an prov'isicn of the etçloyer's persctnel policy, layoffs because of iiffici* or other "b.sinesa related"
reas are nct proeoribed by the act. See Thble 3.9
to fair years of es ani frixqes fran the date of discilarge, with interini
eazTdr dedrted. In iticri, parties are e.Irage1 to resolve their
disp2tes via b1xxi3.z azbitratiat, thid trally a*ifers 1 1 er awards than
jury trials. -lawhas the effect of assigning eiloyees the prerty right
to a jci, (after a prthatiaiazy period) as la as they adequately perfonn
thefr rk ani are rt laid-off of flttuatia i-n bit limits
the potential dvjes that açloyers cild be assessed if they sh.ild violate
this er .
1ile grus in itana ported a bill that *ild require just
cause arxl limit their liability in unlawtul-di iia1suits, uni arxl other
loyee rresentatives ware either ixifferent or also suortive of the
legislatiaL sa tçloyee graipa açeared to wal the "Wrmgful Discharge
fllnnt act" because it ifis1 a just cause firirg requirnent into
law. AltI41 sai eists have argued that limits '
have been detrinntal to unicm organiziig efforts (e.g., Ne.mnn arxl
1984), labor tmi in itana did mt testify in cpiitiai to leqislation
that extenied unjust1i ni 1 protectia to ruuia workers.
)tirid. D.e1ts
Ppti to the aloyit—at-wi]J. dtrmne reonize1 by state rts
in rt years iiy be categorized into three nin classes.First, aril t
cmm -,thejuiiciary in t states will z allow a cause of acticti alleqing
that an içloyee was fired for perfonning an act that was in the interest of
13Pxfessor St. Antoine (1985,p. 563)has claiii1 that, '9be nt
significant relcnt in the le field of labor law during the past decade
was the grwin willingness of the rts to nify the traditicrial doctrine
of ploynnt-at-will." In ad1iticii to the three legal eatia to the
loynt—at-will trmne axiderei here, less crIIuI1 causes of action
have been based ' o negligent infliction of ettiona1
distress (see Shard at al., 1989, 127—147).10
blic policy, sxi as serving jury duty, filing a iorkers' cxsiçeration
claim, or reftsing to xmDit perjury (the "p.iblic policy excq,tion"). Serd,
nny state ts have held that an irplicit orntract exists between an
eployer ar his ip1oyees id birt the ployer to statEnts nde in
persc*,nel harooks, any rials or oral prcinises (the "in1i&1 xTtract
exo,tion"). Pbr exaix1e, s jurisdictia will k1d an tp1oyer liable for
danages if he or she fires an apl'ee so is abeent frczn work five tiiis if a
persca,nel harbook states that six a are regoired for a d1 ni 1.
Thixd,a minority of states have ruled in favor of loyees in unjust-
dii4 1 casesunier the 1l theory that an iip1ied ooc.renant of good faith
ard fair dealing exists bebieen an ployee ard ip1oyer (the "good faith
ep.ion")
14In esse, the good faith e),tion requires an loyer to
treat his 1oyees in a fair ard reasonable nner, whicth is the essere of a
just cause firir clause in a union orntract. An exançle ofa preent
ild be a cx*.irt ru1irx agai.nat a fixm that fired a worker for no other reason
bit to avoid paying the worker a thrisths bczis. The good faith exception is
prthably the ist redical departure frcin the trediticnal ai,loyment-at-will
doctrine because it I1ds aployers to a stazdard of behavior that is not
prescribed by piblic policy ard not set forth in an oral or written statant.
Table 1 reports the year in whicti a jzitcial prent urder eacti of
thes. three legal theories wes first established by either the state prne
cirt or by another 1rt in the state.There is iderab1e variation in
14it shctild be noted that the good faith ani fair dealing exception ard
the lipi.icit cxxitract exception are extaicr of the existing law that
atplies to earcia]. tracts to the esployut re1aticrhip.
For the present analysis, whether aprdent is set by a State Suprx Cirt or by a ler t is of little ecp. because both erode the
p1omt-at-will doctrine, create urcertainty, ard reallocate prcçerty rights.Table 1


























Wzitana 1980 1983 1983
Nthka
Neiada 1984 1.986 1987
Ni Haqhire 1974





Cio 1984 Ok1aI 1976














WaS intx 1984 1978
Weat Virginia 1978 1986 Wisin 1980 1985
Not: Derived frai Iri11VI 1oyt Rixthts ?ral
(Washintcm, DC: ftireau of Natial Affairs, 1988); Witkit
by Shiard et al. (Washirqt, DC: .zreau of
Naticmal Affairs, 1989);aid1ovmit—at-Wil1
(shingta, DC: aireau of Naticma]. AffaIrs, 1982).U
the exçtia to the eeployt-at-will doctrine au the states, ani in the
year that these eeptia were first recxgnized. In aitiat, there may be
flictix i'iiawithina state —anexceptiat iy be recxnize:I by sane
ts in the state bit rt by others. There is nc cwi dira1ica].
order to the ctia retxx)nized by state cxxirts. In 25 states, the p.iblic
policy exEt a wes the first allowablecauseof actiai, while in 14 states
the in].ied axitract e eptia precied the plblic policy exreptia.
It s].d be stressed that entries in Table 1 represent state rt
ni1irs that break fran the traditicnal 1awthey are nct based a
1eisi.atia açroved by the state lejislatre. fle selecticrt prss ani
1enth of servica of state irt justi vary acrces states. These jes
are typically açointed by the gaverncr ani serve ter anin fran t years
to life.16 liZareilt, tt.a state rt preents are grated by a
different pros than bills that are proposed ani adopted by the state
legi.slathre. Bpri11ce these state airt preents reflect the extent of
erosia of the omrtlawe1oynt-at-wiU doctrine, they fonn the key
e3cplanatory variables in the ipirica.l analysis below.
AltIx*ih precise inforuatict a the r*ir*er of unjust-di 1iith
braht to state irts or settled cxzt of irt is unavailable, ae estinate
is that there were iire than 20,000 suits allein terminatiai witha.it cause
peniin in state ts In 1987 (see Westin ani Feliu, 1988).
State-by—state infornaticri ai the avere or variance of the awards in
ujust-d1nial suits (or in cases settled axt of .at) is nct available.
In s well p.thlicized cases, 1iever, awerds granted to unjust-di c'.inissal
claints have eerd the prize for winnirq the state lottery! In ntrast,
16 Klein (1977) for an avervi of the state cxxirt systn.12
awards granted in unjust-diil al countries that require just cause
firir by stathte typically limit the ndnmi .int an exçloyee can rever
to a or two years of back wages.17
I'zt veys by the 1n1 Instithte (tertouzos et a].., 1988) ard by the
.ireau of National Affairs (&card et a].., 1989) provide an irdication o the
average award granted in uirjust-1i ni 1 cases, ard of the axiderab1e legal
costs of an unjust-di nl alsuit. = Irdsurvey emixi 120 unjust-
diiil al ca thatredecidedbyajury trial between 1980ard 1986 in
California. In the 82 didedin favor of the plaintiff (xçloyee),the
initialaverage award was $646,000, bet the 1ln award was $177,000.
breover, post-trial activities i as açeals ard settlents r the
initial jury award by abcut 55 pert, on average. Similarly, the
naticide survey of 260 wragful—tennination casesbetweenJanuary 1986 ard
Cctcer 1988 fcnd that inthe166 cases where eiployees were s.ssful, the
average award was $602,302, while the ivril award was $158,800. Both of
these surveys irdicate that the award distr±biticn is positively skewed.
Arther flzdixq of the rd survey is that the average t of litigation
by an eiployer in defliri an unjust-di n1 suit is $80, 073,
while the iril n legal fee is $65,000. In ition, litigation costs for
ezployees are typically basoil on a x*1tixqx!y of 40 percent of the award.
Thus, with ined legal fees eaeiirig $150,000 on average, the t of
17 Dick, Bart, Jones ard Weeks (1984) for evidon Great &itain.
An inortant limitation of both of thesesurveys is that they eltde
that were settled prior to trial, aixi excltde Uxe that were decided in a xth trial.
19Thesurvey did mt zcArt the typical redition in awards due to
post-trial activities.13
1itigati is nearly asgreat as the averae total Ixxaetary ai.utt awarded to
fu]. ip1oyees in unjust—d4i 1 ses.
LscTi31ati
ten states in thisth a bill to require just use firir has been
intrd in the state legislature are listed in Table 2. lawsthat have
been proposed in these states axe similar in nny respects to the itana law.
Ibreover, these laws wsre often proposed fofliix wsil—p.2blicizei ai stly
ni1ins agaixt ployers. In Clifozia, for enple, a $20 millic verdict
preceded a legislative proposal.
Table 3 mzierizes the salient ctharacteristic of several of the laws.
proposed unjust-di i.i11 lawstypically limit ai1oyer liability by
reiir:ii axbitratiai rather than jury trials, or by denyin damage awards, or
by pirsuir both aproads. In itia, the laws terxl to ver a wide rare
of persar]. acti, irltding for resiatia arxl dx,tia, while they
eale layoffs due to slk dxiard arxi iployee-initiated thrrver. The
reliarx .arbitraticrani a uniform definitia of just muse are thterked to
rcin-e legal fees cxzi.çarei to the ..,.wklawsystn. Finally, althch
reiitalc'nt of fired rkers is a rIy that is typically unavailable urxler
the oriiuri law, the prcxed laws frequently allow reinstatit in wrrnful
terminaticzt cases.
Basiis grps often supported the proposed unjust—1inil1 laws in the
stateswhere they have been proposed. For enple, a 1985 r'ort of the
California Maraxfacturers' Associaticri ex*iraged eployers to support a state
unjust-al iisi1 law(SB 2800] because it wxzld "provide a nxe expedient
meane by whith an may be caipeneatal for a truly wrcnful disdare
—sias thrc.x3h the opportunity to arbitrate —arrve an iployer' STable 2
States Mere Just Cause Firirq t.egis1atia
has be IntrodL into tha State Leis1ature
State Year(s)










Sc*in,es: The &r1ot-At-Wifl Is&ie (Washintcr, D.C.:
, 1983):tharles 8aJly, Jr. aid William Trm løynfltAt-Will rdUniii-O1qn11:Thj Tr oftha '80s (N York: law aid 3sizss, Ire., 1983). 12-
13; aid Ardrei Run, rdthe Derga4cn of tha At—Will 1ovzit cir (P11ir1 r*Lta,Penn.:































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































expire to pinitive daies...."
the other haixi, the sa lifornia Maru.facturers' Association cçposei
an alternative unjust-diissal bill (SB 1348] proposed in the sane year
beause it ld rt shield içloyers' fran large damage suits.
Uytoth,9I,
A lical hypothesis for why alcyer ax etçloyee gras often jointly
just use dini 1 lawsis that s laws are an acxeptable
cxzçrc2nise betn limited iployer liability az ass.mç,tion offault.20 This
cczpranise is tinizcent of the "great irdustrial bargain" that is said to
have orred in workers' ccrçensatiat iriraix:e where e1oyers surrendered
the..... lawdeferes available in work—related injury cases in exdange for
limited liability regardless of fault (see Hoed arxi Hardy, 1984).
Inthe case of job srity, many exployers are willix to supxrt
unjust—di niallegislation ar a "just cause" firirg requirEnent in
exdiane for the inlntation of a strict standard for erployees to rever
pinitive damages and a caisistent, wall-defined legal definition of unjust
dii s1s. n alitiaa1 benaf it of legislation is that it wcild likely
r1iv-e the uirertainty and eçee ithert in c-.lawunjust-dinissal
suits. Legislation bc • anattractive alternative for elayers when state
cazts break fran the traditional rr law ploymant-at-will doctrine.
A testable iuplication of this hypothesis is that unjust-dinissal
legislation is re likely to be pztçce&l and ultimately enacted into law in
states where the cairts have recognized excepticris to the traditional
20 alternative respae by ployers, whith was stgested by a referee,
ld be to lci:by for legislation to pla an aoss-the-iard ilirxj on all
dt'itje awards. This strategy, 1jever, se unlikely to be pirsued in
rea-e to the ercsicn of the ployint-at-will doctrine because, unlike
wragful-terminaticm legislation, it is ixt a viable political ccmranise.15
p1oynnt—at-wiU doctrine. AltI4i ally a state has actually enacted an
unjust-di ___todate bills cizitainixq just muse firinj reuireznts
have be 1ntrodid in several state legislatures in the 1980s. breover, it
is not t*ial for legialatial to be pza1 several t1ii before it is
finally enacted into law. The irical analysis will try to explain the
ore of these prcçoeed laws.
3. Statistical 1del
To pit s strtxthre a the eipirica]. analysis, I that ployer
resistance to, or suort for, an unjust-dini1 statute in a state is based
a arisal between the expected c'peratlxg ts wde.r a statute ard. wder
the om -'law.Specifically, eloyer prt for legis].aticz is mviarized
by a latent variable, y*, detennJ.j by yt —C
—
CL+£whereC. is the
expected osts in the abe of legislatial, CListhe expected alsts wder
legislaticm, ard c is a rai disbzbanoe. Greater values of y* irdicata
iieasix aIplayer ort for unjust-di i al legislatial to lisit
liability aid clarify prcçerty rights.
To fos a &ployer inxntives, it will be ase.md that eployees are
never to unjust-.ll nl1 1egislatia.This assunçsticn ybe
justified either brme a tranefer of prcçerty rights to ployees will
iiease their wealth, or becai.e risk—averse iployees prefer legislaticm
w rr're uzrtai.nty r tze aut _____ 21in this setup
awertis granted iployees br lar e4 (with a cxxtant
variaire), eaplayees will prefer the c..... -' lawto an unjust-di ,zmlcal
statute. The asnptial that aployees uniformly sprt lelislatic*l, however, is rc1-y for identificatim In this a'1°lri1ewe aily cbeexve the cr of prcçosed legislaticm. I'rier, the as.mptial
that do not cwe unjust-d1im4al legislatial se istent
with 1cual eipirical ervaticm. The FLrO itive O*il, for
exaEple, erdorsal just cause firirx legislatial In February 1987.16
the prthabiity that a bill will be ersed by eployer gz az eventually
gain er.zh suort to be prcçcised ax enacted by the state legislature is
given by prcb [ y ) >0,or eqiivalently, by prcb [ CL- ]>
Inthe iipiril izilntaticr of this l, it will be ass.nid that £
hasa listic Q.mz.ilative distrib.iti furtic. The prcçcal of a bill in
the state legislature will be used as an iricator of the latent variable y*.
In particular, the variableis defined to equal ae if a law is prcçosed in
year t, arri zero in otber years.22
ansiiy variables for the three i.n types of ee,tions to the loyrnt-
at-will doctrine retxqnized by the irt systes in eacth state will proxy for
tployers' expected cts In the abeer of legislation. Specifically,
supcse exception i is first reocxnizei in year t*, then the dunhiiy variable
Et is defi to egual if t ￿t*,arxl zero if t <t*.23Th.ese durrny
variables are a plausible proxy for the t wxler the c.-..i'*lawbecause they
reflect the irxxipletes of prcçerty rights, tbe ngn.itzxIe ar variability
of awazs, arxl the legal transaction custs involved in unjust-dinissal suits.
Exceptics to the m.i lawdoctrine are likely to have a delayed effect
on the prcça1 of legislaticrk. Said state legislatures, for exaitple, only
et every other year.ieently, tM basic equation estimated is
F(E1,_11 E2,t_i, E,t_r xt),
alternativearoath, whicth s sested by a referee, is to let
y,. equal a every year after a law has been first prcçxse1 in a state.
Etiticri with this depenient variable led to acre significant cefficients
on the ll eatia reported in Table 4. The definition of y given in
the text is used in the ipirical analysis, hciever, because it iE a precise
irdicator of current ort for legislation.
23 ru'e of the epti '.s unarbigxsly reversed durirg the
peried wder stiy, the exceptia are as to hold in ey YeaX at they re first ronized.17
whereis a vector of state—level explanatory variables ard Fis
logistic .Inadd.ttit, estiiietes that are presented in Sectia 5 allq
for different asnçtia abxit the tiininj of the re1atic*hip between the
rr,vm-' lawexcepticris ard the pztçosa.1 of wr ful—terminatic* laws.
4. lbs Dstr1 r'.ta of Praoeod Un1t-D4 —alLms
To examine the possible effect of eatia to the esloynnt-at-will
doctrine I have rbled data a prose1 unjust-di al stathtes ard rt
ni1irs by state for eath year fran 1981 to 1988. 'The Table ntains
'icriptive statistics for the data set. Table 4 presents nexizami liJe1ihco
logit estites of the oirr of prosed unjust—li i a1 laws for the
pooled saiiçle of states.
The first presents sstites of the effect of the three exctions
to the o ...i lawwithcxxttiUixq for awariates. The reilts shi that
if a state xirt systan allas crie of the excepticris to the eiployment-at-will
doctrine in a given year, the pxthabiity that an unjust-dinic-al bill will
be intrcdL in the state legislature the fo1].in year is irreased. The
liJcelihecxI ratio test of the joint significar of the three extics
reported in the last ri of the table iiitcate that together the exceptions
are highly statistically significant. Fuththerncre, in spite of the high
rxe].atia atq the three dtmsiy variables, the good faith exti ard the
piblic policy ea,tici are ixivfrbtai11y statistically significant.
Several oovariates are ix1ed in 1tnr 2 ard 3toitr1 for
political. ard ecnic factors that might lnf1 the introdixtia of an
unjust—Il n41law. fl good faith aid piblic policy e.xceptia to theTable 4
LcgitEstimates ofPrxo Unjust-Dini cqaJ 1981_1988a
efficient(S.E.)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept —5.947 —6.112 —6.664 5.419 —5.898 —6.590
(1.051) (1.781) (1.987) (.694) (1.620) (1.873)
Gocd Faith 1.616 1.825 1.994
Exception (.612) (.649) (.703)
PublicP1icy 2.561 2.537 2.508
Exception (1.052) (1.057) (1.099)
Thp1i Contract .856 .645 .604
Exception (.606) (.627) (.665)
Tot?1Numberof — 1.505 1.474 1.534
Exceptions A11a..i (.333) (.350) (.367)
UnionRate — 7.912 6.314 — 7.184 6.129
(5.121) (5.603) (4.728) (5.230)
itcratic — —2.463 —2.580 — —1.655 —1.730
I.islature (2.233) (2.245) (2.199) (2.193)
Proportion 1.641 — 3.341
Manufacturirg — (4.725) (4.467)
UnenloynentRate — 8.177 2.812
(13.163) (12.592)
Lc Like1iho —47.68 —46.01 —45.75 —48.83 —47.47 —47.15
x2for Exceptiorb26.01 23.36 23.72
[Prcb.Value] [.0000] [.0000] [.0000]
Notes:
a. Saxrle size is 400. flptjto the nlaw pertain tO yeart-1.
Thetrean ofthe depexxlent variableis .035.
b.These 1JJcelThoratio test of the...joint cx,ntrit*.ition of t1 three exception
duxties has three degrees of freedczn. The critical value for suth a test at the .005
levelis 12.8.18
erloynit-at-will doctrine 1k13.VjriI1l1y statistically significant when
these it.icrial variables are irlix in the eguation, ar theetions
tin.e to be jointly hi1y statistically significant. -pointestimates
in Cblimzi 3 inply that, on avere, the prthabiity that a state laislature
prqoses an unjust-d1ial law is ircrease by 6.7 percentage points if its
tJ gor.xj faith ecepticz, by 8 •5percentage points
if the piblic policy e,tion has been recgniza, axx by 2•0percentage
points if the inpU1tract exction has been recxgnizeci.24 put axxther
way, the prthabiity that a law is prcçxsed is ncre than quainplei if these
muses of acticra have bt all in a state.
A positive bit statistically irignificant relationship is fonr between
the micxt nErbershi.p rate ar the liiceli.beod that an unjust-di 1lawis
pros in a state.25 In itia, an unjust-d I ini al law aears less
likely to be proseI in states where the legislature ists of a greater
p?Xçortictl of wtic ners. The variables maasurir the prortion of
iployit that is in the marufacthrin sector an the u1oynnt rate both
have efficients that are 1l erthan their stardard errors.
Because of tu niiltiUinearity betn the three c ,m law dunry
variables, Qlt 4-6 rort ecificatja that use the total iu±er of
e3ti renized in a state eath year irte of the ixdividual-'
derivativeswere cak,ilat as 100 x (l-)fi., where y =.035
is the prcporticrt of state/year cells to have proposed leg±slation, ardis
a logit efficient estimate.
state—level union rates are r ler available fru the &ireau
of Labor Statistica, a series wes estited by the autbor fr the May ard
Mardi O.1rrent Pcpilation Survey (S) frcx 1981 to 1.987. The 1982 state union
rates were interpolated because the _.didr,t cUect union data in that year.19
law rtii'iii 26 of thespificaticn yields results that are
similar to the previs specificatiaL The total ntnrber of exctions to the
iploynit-at-will doctrine in a state has a pc8itive arii statistically
significant effect .theprthabiity thatt-t1inial legislation will
be prcçoeed by the legislature in the foU.ix year. rdir to the point
estite in li.mr 4, ead &itionaJ. exctia al1 by the rts
increases the prthabiity that legislaticn is prcçosed by 5.2 percentage
points. reover, likelflod ratio tests of the (restricted) specifications
thattj exc,tja (Iluim 4-s) cared to the specificatia that
enter the ea,tia as saxate d.miny variables (Colt 1—3) do rt reject
the restricticris iiixed In 1tm 4_6.27
5 tt1j
Theresults presented so far have establis that a relatiahip exists
between the erosion of the eiployment-at-will doctrine ar the prcpsal of
wjust-di ni si1 legislaticm. A nixti re diffiailt question to answer is
whether this relatiahip is a causal cr, or whether it is due to ittaJ
factors that are czrrelated with the erosion of the-lawai with the
prcal of legislation in a state. Althcxgh causality is diffiilt to
establish in the social sci even when a rarniz&1 experijxnt has been
cx*ted, the issue of causality shculd be idered here buse it is
26 other rds, this variable eals the sum of the three exception
dunanies (E —+E,+E —). AltIhother methcxs of regatir the
In1es ar'osibTh tills aokth is siuçle and is nct rejected by the data.
27 t3n the abeolute difference in the value of the lc likeliflccd
function asyTxçtoticafly fofls a thi-square with two degrees of frczn. For
enp1e, the thi-square statistic for a test of the hypothesis that Cbltmnis 3
and 6 perform ially well is 1.40, and the critical value for sixth a test at
the .10 level is 4.61.20
tral to the interpretatia of the evoluticr of unjust-di i 1islation
given inthispaper.
'the tiiniz of the recxgniticri of exxxptia to elçloymant at will
provides sane leverage to determine causality in this case. The basic prenise
for the analysis is that if the erosiat of the traditictial n law cusei
suort for leislatia, then the erosicm of the cxm-i law sha.ald pree,
rather than -',eei, the proposal of just-di i al leislattcn (see
Graner, 1969). Table 5 presents a variety of estimates of the determinants
of propos 1jislatim usirv different lags aril leads of the vx law
variables to examine causality. The eqiatias use the total nunter ofiicn
law eeptiais as an izdicator of the erosiai of the u lawbuse this
variable is a siiipler "y than sarata duimny variables for ead
extia, ard buse the exEtia are uhiltio3Uinear.28
The rlts in Table 5 lerd sane ort for the view that the erion of
the ploymant-at-will doctrine causes a state lagislathre to prtpose unjust-
dini al legis1atia. In luur 1—4 the past values of the eeptions to
the ti....-' lawhave a greater inp'ict ctitheproposal of 1is1atict than do
future cthanes in the... - law.Both the futue ard past rt rulirgs,
her, are fc*ni to have a statistically significant effect at the .10
level, thith may be e to the high serial Llaticr in the cr" law
decisia in states.
re ozaiçeUin evidence is In O,lt 5 ard 6, whith ir1xe both past
ard fubire Izxlicators (ctortwo year lags ard leads) of the om law in
note that ervatict for states after 1985 re drcççel frczn the
sanple so that the equaticx ild be estiiiated for a cistent set of ervatic*. This is rcry fubire values of the eueptics are un)on for tte years.Table 5








































































Lcg Likelihocd —27.87 —29.50 —30.67 —30.80 —29.42 —27.80
Notes:
a.Saxtple size is 250. The nan of t1 derient variableis .032.
b.The deperxent variablepertains to year t. The year that the ireperent
variables pertain to is 1ist in parentheses.21
the s 1ation.29 These uatia iricate that reccçnizirz nre
excpti to the traditicra1 "vtlawin the past ircreases the li}celihood
that 1eislatia is prosed; while in cxxitrast, the rnition of exceptions
that erode the .-• lawin the ftxthre has a 1l,nativeeffect on the
prosal of arrent leislatic*. reover, the effect of future erosion of
the ormi law c rrent legislatiai statisticallyinsignifica.t once
we a.int for the past extent of the eric of the law. These
rilts surcort a lusicz that thaes in the lawprecipitate
lislativeattçsts.
Finally, t iticria1 pies of eiider are also nsistent with the
intetpretaticin that the erosicm of the omm .ilawhas causel the state
leislature in iny jurisdicti to ider unjust-dinial lislation.
First, available evider suests that the pattern of renition of
exc,tias to the 1oyment-at-wLll doctrine by state orrts is haazard,
unrelatI to the wage level, uniployuit rate, rion, or diraMc
tharacteristice of states (see Dertc*izos et al., 1988). This finuir stgests
that the L law excepticrs are uirrelate.i with anittal variables because
they o nre or less rarly. Ard saxrd, the political aid nnic
variables that were izltziei in the equati in Thble 4 hal little
explanatory pr aid did rxt rlIwe the effect of the lawexceptions.
29iiticza1 1es aid lags were rw± irlied simltar2sly in the
auati because of severe iailtillinearity.22
6.
In many states the .iiwrlawa1oymant-at-will doctrine has been ered
aver the past der by state rt rulir. It is argued that the new
• lawdoctrine has prcKb uirtain an1
irxEplete prcperty rights to j, often 1eavir loyers ar eloyees
ui of the legality of persc*inel acti. ?.krver, when disputes arise
aver ii rcper di i c1 gthe 1tjuiicial systa inçoses large
taneacti ts ani highly variable awards a* the parties.
Evide is presented shcwin thatust-diisal legislatia is ztre
likely to be prcçosel in states where the darthre fran the treditional
rploymant—at-will doctrine by *he irts has been t extr. When
pztre1, this legislation is typically designed to limit xployer liability,
expedite dispute settlaints, red legal ts, ar clarify prqerty rights.
There is a sibiity, of xse, that at least initially unjust-diissal
legislation cild irrease urrtairity arxl disputes over prcperty rights.
As a practical matter, unjust-dii al legislation may be Pareto
superior to the withered etplayt-at-will doctrine. The aital eviderre
that graipa in sa states actually suçort ani or unjust-
dii 1 legislationto limit liability suggests that sixi "rx-fault-firirg"
legislation is a viable political ar1 &nical alternative to the
rt systen. If state zrts itin.ie to dilute the eçloymant-at-will
doctrine, the analysis presented in this paper ld predict that many states
will follcw )xitana by prcposin ani enactin legislation to limit ertployer
liability, clearly re-define prcçerty rights, aixl redi.e legal sts.
A natural estion to raise is, why has only a state been susful so
far in passin wr gful—tezm.thaticrt legislation? Two aiers suggest23
theelves. First, the threat to 1oyers wer ti c" -ilawis rot great
4i in t statea to provoke ifficient suçort for legislaticxi. Se,
a n.Livial .itin period is often rel?lired before legis1atia can be
"-fuUy steered thr4i the lsgislature. br 1e,rethan a r'iie
beforeA1 thefirst state to enact a right—to-rk law
after path 1a e saxotiad by the Taft-Hartley its of 1947. 29
Siii11'irly, there ze 1 l in the tim of piuic sector baza1nin
laws in ny states (Farber, 1988).
. resalta in this pap jgmt that in the lct nsi, the prripects for
the rcv,e of just-dc i al 1egis1atia are linked to the erosia of the
law eip1oynxt—at-wil]. doctrine. A1th4 it is diffi.a1t to prodict
the futhre .arse of the —.--law,Da1d Irwitz (1977, p.12) has roted
that "doctrinal erosim in partiaalar is rot easily ste1" because
pts ne]ce it diffiailt for airts to reverse t1e1ves, aid buse
jnes typically serve laij terie. C*i the other haz, a rent decisim by
the 1ifarnia Ort (Foley- v. Interactive ta), r1tiidi ai&.agother
thixqs, 1.tits rbuIye ards in reaovera breath of the vnt of gxxi
faith aid fair dealin, aid zet rulinjs In Midiigan, &q.est that the
dL-tiC trazfotim of the loyit-at-will doctrine nayhavebei
abated in s jried1t1.
states, iever, pced right—to-irk laws of dubiis legal status prior to the Taft-Hartley nts.Ape.ix Table
Mear a Standard Deviatia
law Nolaw All
Variable PrceedProsed States
G Faith .429 .080 .093
aepticr (t—l) (.514) (.272) (.290)
PublicPulicy .929 .430 .448
crpticn(t—1) (.267) (.496) (.498)
Inp1ie Xrtract .643 .319 .330
cxptii (t—1) (.497.) (.467) (.471)
Total N%er of 2.000 .829 .870
ccti All (1.038) (.791) (.828)
(t—1)
Unicrt !xbershp .213 .171 .172
Rate (.053) (.072) (.072)
tcratic .538 .598 .596
Lislature (.064) (.194) (.191)
Prçortiak .191 .186 .186
Maru.facthrir (.063) (.074) (.074)
UniçioyixntRate .079 .075 .075
(.027) (.024) (.024)
Notes:—sustis to derive t1 lawvariables
1ist in Table 1. !fl uni rate s 1o1ated by the author based uthe C?S. The unp1oyntratear prçortia of the rkforc,ein
rnariifacthrirqare fr the EaJc Rort of t1e P)esi1t
(Washirqtcz,DC: Goverrrnt Printim Office, 1989). The fractict of
tba legislabire that bel to tba dcratic party is derived frcn variis I of Statisticel tract of the United States
(Washintcii, DC: Dartt of rve, reau of the CerUS).24
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